| Naohiro Ogawa: Right now there are three        abnormal phenomena going on in Japan. According to the Economic Planning        Agency of the Japanese government, they call it the three "two much"        phenomena.         The first "too much" phenomenon is that        Japanese children study too much. In Japan 1.6 million kids enroll in the        Kumon program, and according to government data 48% of primary school kids        go to juku. In fact, including my son, he started going to juku when he        was in fourth grade. He is in eighth grade right now, but he is one year        behind other kids because most of his friends started in the third grade,        so he is trying to catch up with them. And this, the juku--this extra        session after regular school hours--is most important. Because that is the        way they study for the entrance exams. My son knows that he has to keep on        doing this until he graduates from high school and until he passes the        university exam. So he must attend juku virtually every day for many, many        years (and I have to pay a lot of money for him). On the average, a father        and his children spend only 37 minutes a day together at home. So the        problem is, I think, the children are too busy.        But it is not just the children who are busy.        The second "too much" phenomenon is that the Japanese people work too        much. According to data, Japanese people work 1,966 hours a year. But        Americans work less. And Japanese work much more than the French and        Germans. Germans work 1,590 hours a year, so we work about 300 hours more        than the German people.        So we're trying to reduce working hours.        According to the government plan, by the end of this month, we should        achieve the target of 1,800 hours a year, but it doesn't look like we are        going to make it.        But anyway, the third "too much" is that        Japanese old persons have too much free time. That is a big problem.        According to one survey, Japanese elderly persons, particularly 70 and        over, spend five-and-a-half hours watching TV every day. Five and a half.        The young Japanese in their twenties spend two-and-a-half hours watching        TV. So obviously the older generation spends at least twice as much time        watching TV.        And we have increasing shares of elderly        persons in the population; we have too many elderly persons in Japan, that        is the problem.        The first slide shows the changes in the        proportion of persons aged 65 and over since the Meiji period. During the        Meiji period this proportion was about 5%. It was fairly stable, but when        Japan made an advance and invaded China in 1935, that year had the lowest        ever share of persons aged 65 and over in Japanese history,        4.7%.        Since then it has been rising continuously.        In 1970 we hit the 7% level. According to a 1967 U.S. population        publication, the 7% mark is a sort of cut-off for judging whether a        society is aged. Japan hit the 7% level in 1970. That year, I went back to        Japan to collect my dissertation data, because my dissertation was on        population aging, and everybody, virtually everybody, including government        officials, thought I was absolutely crazy. Japan wasn't interested in        aging at that time. Pollution was the major issue.        But 10 to 15 years later, as this graph        shows, the pace of aging accelerated, and people started paying greater        attention to aging.        Drop in fertility        The definition of aging is fairly loose. An        increase in the elderly population versus a decrease in the younger        population. This means a longer life expectancy and reduced        fertility.        So maybe we should look at the components of        these demographic trends. The first one shows changes in fertility.        Between 1947 and 1949 we had a baby boom. This is the most important        message that I want to convey to you today. The Japanese baby boom was        very short, between 1947 and 1949, three years. After that Japanese        fertility went down. Between 1947 and 1949 we had a large number of        births, something like 2.7 million a year. And after that it declined        dramatically.        After 1949, Japanese fertility went down by        50% in ten years' time, which was the first such experience in the history        of mankind. And so, obviously, something dramatic was going on. Up until        1950 the Japanese economy was in a shambles. I mean severely crippled. The        famous demographer, Warren Thompson, went to Japan in 1947 and 1948 at the        request of President Truman as an advisor for General MacArthur and looked        around the country. In a report he submitted to the president, he said        that Japan was hopeless. No way it could recover. But Japan might be able        to export the following four items by 1970. Can you guess what they        were?        Audience: Toys.        Ogawa: Toys, good guess, good        guess.        Audience: Textiles.        Ogawa: Textiles, that is right. Three more to        go. Okay, bicycles. And rubber shoes and truck lights. He couldn't predict        automobiles. Why did he make a mistake? I mean he is a well-known        demographer. Why did he make a mistake like that?        The fact is this: he couldn't predict a 50%        reduction in fertility in ten years' time. He submitted the report in        1947. In 1950 Japanese per capita income was $153, which was even lower        than that of the Philippines. The Philippines' per capita GNP was $172,        Mexico's was $181. So Japan was behind Mexico and the Philippines. And        U.S. per capita GNP was $1,883, so the U.S. per capita income was about        twelve times as high as the Japanese per capita GNP.        So Japan was really in bad shape at the time,        but things started getting better. In the beginning, fertility reduction        was facilitated through abortion. Three-quarters of pregnancies in the        first half of the 1950s ended in abortion. In the second half, 50% of        pregnancies were aborted. And in the first half of the 1960s pregnancies        were prevented with contraceptives.        So fertility declined, first through abortion        and then through contraceptives. And as you know, the pill is still        illegal in Japan. Japan is the only industrial nation which hasn't        legalized the pill. But it looks like it is going to be legalized by the        end of this year.        Because of the decline in fertility, Japan        could manage to save a lot, and capital formation was rapidly promoted. By        1960 Japan was ready to grow very rapidly and enter the "Golden 60s."        Annual per capita income growth reached 7%. Real growth was 11%, and that        lasted for about ten years, which is quite impressive.        Because the baby boomers came into the labor        market, we had high quality labor at a low price. Plus, there was the        accumulated capital due to the births averted, and the international trade        environment was excellent at the time in favor of Japanese products. Plus,        we could borrow foreign technology from advanced nations. Due to the        combination of these factors, Japan was able to recover quite        well.        By the end of the 1960s, Japan's per capita        GNP was the second largest in the Free World, which was something totally        inconceivable at the beginning of and right after World War II.        But something happened in 1966. Births        dropped dramatically. Why? Because it was the year of the fire horse, and        according to Japanese superstition, girls born in that year will have very        unhappy lives, and most likely will kill their husbands. [Laughter] So        that is why parents tried to avoid births. They either had babies the year        before that or the year after that.        There are two steps. Fertility dropped after        1950, held steady for a while, and it started going down again after the        oil crisis in 1973.        Choosing to stay single        Let's now look at the changing methods of        fertility reduction. Around 1970, a large number of births were averted        with contraceptives and abortion. But in the recent past, the pattern is        different. The proportion of singles has been rising dramatically in the        last 15, 20 years. So the source of declining fertility is        different.        Japan is quite unique in that sense. Marriage        patterns have been changing. It is one of the silent revolutions underway        in our country. And the question is, why?        According to the 1995 population census, 50%        of women in their late 20s are single. The highest figure is Sweden's, but        the U.S. is much lower than the Japanese level. And what is surprising to        me is that back in 1985 the proportion of singles for this particular age        group was only 30% in Japan. And in 1990, five years later it was 40%.        Before 1995 I checked with all my demographer friends in the United States        and England and asked them to guess the value for 1995. We had long, long        discussions, and our guess was 42%. We never expected it would go as high        as 50%.        Audience: Excuse me, but you are using        unmarried and single synonymously.        Ogawa: Yes.        Audience: And that, I think, is where your        Swedish data are misleading. Because we have many more        cohabiting.        Ogawa: Yes, yes. I'll come to that        later.        Yes, so in other words, over the last 15        years, every 5 years, the percentage of singles increased by 10 percentage        points, which is quite shocking, even for Japanese people. So why is it        that Japanese women don't want to get married? That is the        question.        First of all, values are changing. According        to a survey I was involved in, 75% of Japanese women in their twenties        support a concept called "New Singles." This means that "I would like to        enjoy the single life without worrying about marriage." And 75% of them        support this idea, but in the case of men only 50%. So in other words,        even when Japanese men want to get married, Japanese women may        not.        This is obviously a big change in values, and        the major factor behind this change has been that more women are receiving        higher education, living in urban areas, and are in paid employment. As        families modernize and grow more urbanized, Japanese women will be better        educated and further entrenched in the labor market. And it looks like the        proportion of young women supporting this idea will increase in the years        to come.        Education is a big factor. Japanese women's        educational levels are rising like crazy. In fact, if you combine        four-year colleges and junior colleges, the proportion of Japanese women        receiving higher education is 48% right now. And in the case of men it is        lower, at 42%.        I did some econometric computations on        this--computing the rate of return on education. In the case of        women--suppose there are two girls. One girl stops with a high school        education and starts working right away. The other girl proceeds to a        four-year college. This girl will earn a 60% higher annual salary than her        friend. So the rate of return is 60%, which is quite startling. But in the        case of men it is only 20%, so I tell my male students that they don't        have to come to university, I want to have girls because that is more        sensible from the economic point of view. [Laughter] But anyway, apart        from that, I asked the question, "Why?" A lot of Americans, a lot of        foreigners tend to believe that the Japanese woman's status is very low.        Which is true, depending on how you look at it. But differences in hourly        wages for those below age 30 are shrinking dramatically. Back in 1950 the        difference was 1 to 0.7. Now it is 1 to 0.86. It's been steadily narrowing        between men and women. Why has this happened?        The reason is that more women are getting        hired. The difference in starting pay between men and women is not so        great. About the same. But those women who go on to get higher wages don't        want to get married. Because they don't want to get married, they        accumulate seniority and get even higher wages. Because they get more pay        they still don't want to get married.        In other words, because they don't want to        get married, they gain seniority, and because of this they get higher        wages. This leads, in turn, to substantial economic autonomy, so they have        even less compunction to get married.        Co-residence with parents        I did a survey last year on what are the        important factors on the part of women in choosing their prospective        mates. I did a similar survey back in 1988. In 1988 I didn't include this        category, but personality is quite important. Almost 85% of the women        surveyed thought that was quite important. The second most important was        income. About 78% of the women said that was very important in choosing a        marriage partner. And the third most important was occupation. About 75%        of them said this was a factor. But what is most shocking was this.        Between 1988 and 1996 the percentage of women who said potential        co-residence with parents-in-law was a crucially important criteria for        choosing their prospective mates rose dramatically. Well that is quite        defensible. In Japan, about 75% of my students are either the eldest son        or eldest daughter. And according to this analysis, the major determinant        of co-residence is birth order. Because of Confucian teaching, if you are        the oldest, you have to live with your parents. This has been changing,        but it is still a basic, fundamental force that is in  operation.        Previously there were lots of second and        third sons, so women did not always confront the prospect of living with        parents-in-law. But these days nearly all the boys are the oldest. I mean        there are no other sons. So, if a woman is also the only daughter or the        eldest daughter, they have to look after both sets of parents. So        naturally co-residence has become a very important factor in choosing a        prospective mate.        The probability of co-residing with parents        at the time of marriage is settling. Back in 1965 about 62% of marriages        led to co-residence with parents immediately after marriage. But the rate        has been falling, falling, falling. Yet even now, more than 30% of newly        married couples live with parents.        Another factor which is affecting the        marriage market is the proportion of marriages which are arranged.        Arranged marriages are falling. Back in 1955 there was a sort of social        force that dictated that men and women of certain age had to get married,        often through arranged marriages. But this phenomenon has been falling        quite rapidly. It used to be that 63% of marriages were arranged, but now        it is less than 10%.        So social binding is gone. It is more like a        free market. People can choose their prospective mates in the "marriage        market."        When to have children        Another major change over the past few        decades is the interval between marriage and birth of the first child.        According to a 1984 PDR article written by Morgan, Brinks, and Parnell,        Japanese people have a very short first birth interval. I think in 1965        about 16 months was the average interval between marriage and first birth.        But recently it has been changing. At that time, according to them,        Japanese couples wanted to have a kid ri ht away because Japanese women        found the source of happiness in children. In other words, a woman's        primary source of happiness was the children, rather than the husband, so        women wanted to have kids right away. But in America the conjugal        relationship is more important. That is why the birth interval in the        United States is much longer. On average the interval between marriage and        first birth is 24 to 26 months.        But now, the Japanese first birth interval is        almost like America's. It has been changing, but this figure is quite        tricky. There are more couples who are having children before marriage. In        Japan marriage meant procreation. But this doesn't really hold        anymore.        The average age of first marriage for        Japanese women is 27.7 and that for men is 30.7. They are very high. They        are some of the highest in the entire world. But, according to my 1996        analysis, the average age of first sexual contact for girls has been        falling dramatically, so the period in which they are sexually active has        been getting longer.        Even though the period of sexual activity is        longer, I mean without getting married, co-habitation is very low.        Compared to Sweden, the co-habitation rate in Japan is one-fortieth of the        Swedish case.        Nobody can really explain what is happening.        I mean I am having a hard time. I am trying to write a paper on that.        Japanese singles lead a unique l festyle. They are sexually active, but        they are not cohabiting, and the age of marriage is very high. And Japan        is the only country in the world which has a rapidly increasing per capita        income and a rising age of first marriage. And they tend to have a sort of        reverse relationship. If the income is high, they should get married        earlier, but that is not what is happening in Japan. There are so many        contradictory phenomena going on in Japan, and I hope that Stanford people        will look into this matter as one of their research topics.        And I am a bit worried about Japanese women        because arranged marriages are gone; the marriage market is free, but        according to my data in Japan 45% of single girls are not dating. I mean        this figure has been stable since the beginning of the 1990s. The marriage        market hasn't changed at all, and with arranged marriages gone, it looks        like there is no way for Japanese girls to get married.        Japan used to have a universal marriage        pattern, but this universal marriage concept is rapidly disappearing in my        country.        A graying society        Back in 1950 the Japanese life expectancy for        males was 56 years old, while in the U.S. it was 66 years old--a ten year        difference.        But today, Japanese life expectancy is 76        years old, and the U.S. figure is 73. So over this 40-year period Japan        and the U.S. crossed over somewhere. I think in 1960, if I remember        correctly. And in the case of women, Japan's life expectancy is of course        the highest in the entire world. Life expectancy hasn't been growing        because of reduced infant mortality, which is already the lowest in the        entire world: One child per thousand births.        The major source of the improvement in life        expectancy comes from the prolonged survivorship of older people. Like the        population aged 40 plus.        So that is good news for me. I can live a        little longer, maybe it is bad news for my wife, but I don't        know.        [Laughter]        Anyway, because Japan has a low infant        mortality rate, the number of births actually determine the shape of the        population bell. In another 20 years, those who are 40 years old now will        be retiring. They will be 60 years old. And those who were born last year        will be 20 years old and they will be entering the labor market. And the        way things are moving, we are going to have the severest population aging        issues of any country in the next century.        I'll show you something. This is based on my        population projection using a chronometric model, which is different from        the one the government uses. I released this data to the public a few        years ago, and I got a tremendous amount of criticism.        According to this, the population will peak        in 2007 and it will start shrinking after that. And then I got called; I        went to the Liberal Democratic Party to defend myself. How did I come up        with this number, party officials asked, because the government expected        the peak to occur in 2012 rather than 2007.        This has tremendous implications in terms of        tax revenues. Right now the Japanese government has a huge deficit, and it        wants to increase tax revenues, but if the population peaks much earlier        than expected, then businesses won't invest so much, and if businesses        don't invest, then revenues will decline.        So the government thinks that the        psychological effect is enormous, and I was even called to the Diet to        defend myself for two hours on how I came up with this number. I think        this is ridiculous.        But anyway, last month the government made        changes. According to its newest projection, the population will peak in        2007. Exactly the same year as I had projected three years ago. I am not        bragging; it's probably a coincidence, but that is what        happened.        Sometime this year or early next year, we are        going to have more elderly persons than young kids, ages 0 to 14. And in        2007, 20% of Japan's population will be 65 and over, which will be the        first such experience in the history of mankind. By that time Japan will        have lots of problems.        In Japan, the level of aging varies        considerably from region to region. And in one district, 47% of the        population is 65 and over. I am now involved in formulating the fifth        development plan for Japan. We have projected that by 2025, there will be        communities where 87% of the population is 65 and over. Can you imagine        87% of the residents being older persons? There will be no tax revenues        there. I mean this is a serious matter.        Today there are around 4,700 administrative        offices and branches around the country, and I think most of them are        going to have to be closed because depopulated areas will be all over the        country. So one of the biggest issues that we on the Council on Natural        Land Development face is what we should do with these ghost towns. It is a        really big issue right now.        And also, there is the major problem of        shifting the capital out of Tokyo to a northern region; I think we have to        pick the place by October next year.        And then there is the issue of citizens who        are 75 and over. Seventy-five and over is called the "old-old," and they        often need nursing attention, medical care, and so on and so        forth.        Right now it is not bad, they constitute        about 40% of the elderly population. But in the next century, in the year        2018, the share is expected to be 48%. At that point, Japan will have the        highest level. In other words, early in the next century, Japan will have        a serious problem of caring for aged persons.        But do you know which age group is the one        growing at the fastest rate?        Audience: Over 100?        Ogawa: Oh, good. Do you know the rate? My        time deposit earns only 1.1% a year, but these centenarians are growing at        an annual rate of 13%. Enormous, you know. I mean the fastest-growing        segment of the population. When you reach age 100 you can get a silver cup        from the prime minister. But if the current trend continues, it is going        to be copper, and pretty soon wooden cups maybe. I mean, it is        serious.        In fact I was really shocked two years ago to        see this lady in a newspaper playing the shamisen. She was a geisha, and        she was older than 100. I mean she is 100 years old. I don't know what she        does, I mean, I've never heard of a 100-year-old geisha, but that really        shows that Japan is an aging, graying society.        Oldest nation in the world        Let me summarize the basic features of        Japan's aging population. In the year 2025, the proportion of those 65 and        over will be highest in Japan, followed by Italy and Hong Kong, although        Hong Kong will be disappearing. Among all the industrial nations, Japan        will be the oldest in the entire world.        Although the United States will also be        aging, in relative terms, the U.S. will be much younger than Japan. The        reason is that the postwar baby boom lasted only two years in Japan, but        in the U.S. there was a longer baby boom period, from 1947 to 1964.        Seventeen years. Three versus 17 makes a lot of difference in the next        century. Why does the E.U. need to be integrated? Because the E.U.        countries are all aging. They have to revitalize their economies by        uniting their countries.        Japan's 65 and over population is expected to        move from 10% to 20% in 22 years time, but Germany and Sweden took 70        years and 65 years, respectively. It took them a long time to move from        10% to 20%, and they are having serious financial problems, particularly        Sweden.        I couldn't believe it, you know, the Swedish        fertility rate is almost as low as the Japanese fertility rate. Japanese        total fertility rate is 1.42, which is the lowest ever in history, I mean        for Japan. But Swedish fertility is falling like crazy. I couldn't believe        it. Sweden, until two years ago, had one of the highest fertility rates in        the entire industrialized world. But it's now close to the U.S. figure        because of a depression. Poor economic performance leads to        infertility.        The Swedes have pension problems and so        forth, but they had 65 to 70 years to make all adjustments. But in the        case of Japan, we had only 22 years. We cannot make any mistakes because        the pace is so fast.        In the year 2007 Japan will be reaching the        20% level, becoming the first country to do so. Japan has been good at        copying from other countries; we call it "adaptation," but people in other        countries say "copying." But we can't copy foreign policies any more,        since Japan will be first in terms of aging, and we will have to create        our own policies.        So Japan's creativity will be tested after        2007. We have only ten years to go, so we have to really get to work to        formulate policies which minimize the problems of population        aging.        In the year 2025 females will outnumber males        because of the difference in life expectancy, and we are going to have a        lot of women, older women.        We might call it the feminization of the        older population. Many of these women will be widows.        And it is currently my hunch that they will        be living alone. Right now 14.7% of the elderly, 65 and older, are living        alone in the case of women. But the share is going to go up to 23% in the        years to come. In the U.S. it is about 40%, so compared to the U.S. it is        nothing, but in the next century it is going to be at least slightly        higher than half of the U.S. level, which is still a major revolution as        far as Japan is concerned because Japan has had this three-generational        co-residence custom. So that is a major change as far as Japanese society        is concerned.        Women's growing care burden        And now, my question is, "Who is really going        to look after elderly persons?" When this question was posed to married        couples, 85% of the husbands said, "Spouse, wife." But do they know that        one out of two Japanese wives have thought about divorce. And then I        calculated when divorces increase, and I wondered how I can find out if my        wife has started thinking about divorce or not?        [Laughter]        Anyway, I wrote to a friend in Britain and we        came up with something interesting. It is a very complicated diametric        analysis, but the result is simple. If a full-time housewife takes on        full-time employment, the risk of divorce goes up like crazy and is        statistically very strong. If she shifts from being a full-time housewife        to doing a part-time position, nothing. Nothing that great.        So I told my friend, "If your wife wants to        work then you should ask this way. 'Do you want to work part-time or        full-time?' If she says 'part-time.' No problem. But if it is full-time,        forget it, you are in danger--in a crisis."        [Laughter]        Labor force participation by women aged 40 to        64 isn't that spectacular. But the rise has been phenomenal. And according        to some, the rise for this age group is the fastest ever recorded in an        industrialized nation.        So the level is not that high, but the pace        of the rise is very fast. It is connected with divorce, that is my basic        idea.        Divorce does not carry much social stigma        anymore. It is sort of a trendy thing. And by the end of my talk you will        find out that divorces in Japan will be increasing in the years to come        because demand for female labor will be increasing in this aging        society.        As I said earlier, the demographic shift is        enormous in Japan, and natural caregiving capacity is going down very        rapidly in various parts of Japan. Despite this fact, the government        started a program called the Golden Plan in 1990, which promotes in-home        care.        I did a projection. The Japanese family's        support capacity will go down by 50% in 10 years' time, and this is        something I can predict with high accuracy. The reason is the numbers        going to the numerator and denominator are all already born. They are        there already. So what I can say for sure is that the Japanese family's        care capacity will go down 50%.        In the year 2005, which is close to the year        2007, Japan's family care capacity will be the lowest in the entire world.        The U.S. is pretty high. Again this is connected with the duration of the        baby boom. And also the U.S. allows foreign workers to come in. That is        another factor.        The Japanese government is trying to promote        in-home care through the Golden Plan. Daycare centers and facilities for        short term stays are being increased, and more health workers are being        enlisted. But the key is having somebody live with elderly        persons.        Co-residency is the key. And in the case of        Japan, the proportion of the 65-and-older group living in institutions is        only 1.6 percent, but in the case of the U.S. it is 5%, Germany is 4%,        Sweden 9%. Many Japanese elderly persons living in institutions, moreover,        are in the hospital. We call this phenomenon "social        hospitalization."        Japan has a universal health insurance        system. If I get sick I go to the hospital and I get hospitalized. I don't        have to pay much. I pay only 10% of the medical bill and the rest is paid        by the government. Because of this, do you know how long Japanese people        stay in the hospital once they are hospitalized? An average of 45 days, as        opposed to 10 days in the United States. Does this mean the Japanese        people are four-and-a-half times as sick as Americans? No. We go to the        hospital because we don't have to pay that much. Also, we lack the        intermediate nursing institutions; geriatric hospitals are quite a new        development, so all these elderly persons wind up in the        hospital.        And if we put our parents in a hospital, we        don't feel so bad. If we don't take care of them, it is a big social        stigma. So in most cases we put ourpa rents in a hospital so we don't feel        so bad.        But the government can't really cope with        rising medical costs, so it decided, you know, to reduce costs through the        implementation of the Golden Plan. But the key is co-residence. Can we        really retain a high level of co-residence?        End of Japan's high savings        rate        According to the 1978 White Paper on Health        and Welfare, Japan had a high percentage of elderly persons who are        residing with children compared with other industrial countries like        France, the U.K., Finland, the United States, and Sweden. The incidence of        co-residence in Japan is falling, b t it is still high. So the government        is trying to take advantage of this. That is why it implemented the Golden        Plan.        Japan is only one-twenty-fifth the size of        the United States, but the total value of Japanese land is four times the        total U.S. land value. This means that Japanese land prices are enormous.        I mean outrageous.        So we can't afford to buy a house, and thus        parents have a strong bargaining position. They say, "We'll give you the        house in return for co-residence," which is a strategic motive. The        parents provide stock, and the kids provide a service in a stock-flow        contract. Because of this arrangement, Japan managed to maintain high        rates of savings. It is called the dynasty model, where there is a        transfer from one generation to another so that total savings don't go        down. But will this pattern endure in the years to come?        The crucial factor is what happens to        co-residency. In putting a paper together with Andy Meisen, I've found        that the dynasty model definitely works. Depending on how much they        receive from parents, kids display very different consumption        patterns.        The main determinant of co-residency, as I        said earlier, is birth order. If you are the eldest son, you have to live        with your parents. Arranged marriages are another factor. Parents used        arranged marriages as a mea s of controlling the flow of resources between        generations. A criteria for an acceptable bride may be her willingness to        live with her aging in-laws. There's a kind of control there. Education is        yet another factor. Well-educated parents tend to prefer not to live with        the kids. Because more people are receiving higher education, it looks        like the incidence of co-residence will be declining in the years to        come.        If that is the case, savings in Japan could        go down further, and in fact the government has recently published a        document encouraging elder people to start thinking about the "reverse        mortgage scheme."        One Japanese city has a unique system whereby        a resident can make arrangements to transfer ownership of a house to the        city, which then becomes responsible for providing care and meals for as        long as the resident if alive.        The interesting, or the scary, part of this,        though, is that the kids don't always know about it. Parents make a deal        with the city, but the kids aren't necessarily informed or consulted about        this. All these kids assume that they'll get the land and the house. But        when their parents pass away, there's no more land. The city keeps the        land. The city keeps the house.        This kind of thing is going on, and in fact        the government is officially encouraging elderly people to look into this.        If that is the case, Japanese savings might be affected considerably in        the years to come.        Changing family  organization        Co-residing with the husband's parents, which        is called patrilocality, is still dominant. But matrilocality, or        co-residing with the wife's parents, is growing two-and-half times more        rapidly. And my guess is that if the current trend continues, by the year        2000 co-residence with the wife's parents will be greater.        This would represent a major change in the        Japanese family organization. In the past, co-residence invariably meant        living with the husband's parents, and so this would be a major        change.        The government is trying to use co-residence        as a way of overcoming the problem of population aging, but as I have just        said, co-residence will probably go down further.        I did a survey quite recently and asked women        whether they had ever thought about dissolving the co-residence        arrangement. And amazingly, 55% of the respondents said they had. In the        case of men it was only 25%. Men don't live together with the parents all        day. They are just home at night. But women have to spend the whole day        with their mothers-in-law. So the in-law problem is very serious in Japan        and, of course, the old lady is the supervisor and the young wife is the        subordinate, so naturally they have frictional problems. And I think that        this means, if there is a job outside, most likely Japanese women will use        it as an excuse to not live with their in-laws.        There is one good thing about living with the        wife's parents. The divorce risk is 20% lower than if the co-residency is        with the husband's parents. The wife obviously can get along better with        her own parents, so I think it is better to live with the wife's parents        if couples have to live with parents at all. And then I don't think        marriage will be such a big gamble for women.        Living together with parents can mean that        the parents will help provide childcare services, allowing women to pursue        their careers. But at the same time she might end up having to look after        her parents or in-laws when they get sick, develop senile dementia, or        become bed-ridden. So it is a gamble. But I can compute the cost of        co-residence in this way. Suppose a couple has one kid, one birth. How        much will the child cost in terms of hourly wages? If they have one baby,        a woman's earning capacity goes down by 10%, but if she has to stay at        home and look after elderly parents, she loses 1.2% per month.        You think this 1.2% is nothing, but on the        average women spend 10 months looking after elderly persons, I mean, once        they get sick. So they lose 12%. So in the case of childbearing, 10%, in        the case of caring for a parent, it is 12%. So they are equally damaging        for women. A public support system has to be introduced as quickly as        possible because there are all these women having to provide care. This        usually results in a conflict between a career and caregiving.        The burden of supporting an aging        society        Despite these indications of weakening family        support the government is trying to shift the responsibility back to        families. This is because the total of health insurance contributions,        pension contributions, social security contributions, and tax        payments--the so-called national burden rate--will be 45% of national        income in the years to come. According to my estimation, we will reach the        45% level in the year 2005, which is less than 10 years away. And we will        reach 50% in 2014.        My conclusions are quite comparable to the        ones obtained by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry and the        Economic Planning Agency. They have their own econometric models, and we        all came up with the same conclusions        An IMF study says that in 2010, the Japanese        pension scheme will go bankrupt. This means we have to revise our social        security system quickly.        And besides that, economic growth performance        will be affected by the fact that the labor force will begin shrinking in        the year 2001. The hours worked will be less and less, and so more women        will have to be come i to the labor market. But again this is not really        possible.        As I said earlier, women will be expected to        perform many more tasks for the family. The number of elderly persons,        bed-ridden persons aged 65 and over will go up like crazy. Almost like        three times in the next 35 years.        I have calculated the burden of providing        care to these frail, elderly persons. I mean the burden for women in        various age groups. And the most astonishing figure is the rise in the        burden of providing care to the elderly for those aged 40-49. Right now        one out of fifteen women in their forties provide care at home. But in the        year 2025 the share is going to be 46%. Sixty-four percent of women will        have to provide care at home for elderly persons who are suffering from        senile dementia or are bedridden.        And the problem is this. Those who will be 40        years old in 2025 are the ones going to elementary school today. Can we        really count on them?        The percentage of women of reproductive age        who expect their children to care for them in old age is going down. In        1950, about two-thirds of women hoped to depend on their children in old        age, but this figure has been going down continuously. It really dropped        dramatically right after a system of social security was        implemented.        In a survey, women of reproductive age were        asked, "What do you think about looking after your elderly parents?" For        many years a high percentage said it was a good custom or that it was        one's natural duty. Almost 80%. But starting from 1986 it dropped        dramatically. And it is still falling.        I had a hard time publishing this paper; the        reviewers said, "Why did it start falling?" My guess was this. Around 1985        the government started publishing a lot about population aging. In 1986        the government came up with a document saying, in effect, "Look, don't        expect the government to provide you with financial assistance. You take        care of yourself." And in 1987 they said, "Don't expect anything from us        in terms of manpower. You take care of yourself."        Before then, women thought, "Oh, maybe the        government will look after my parents. No problem." So they always said,        "Oh, it is a good custom. But I don't have to take care of them        myself."        But when reality sunk in, they started        showing their real feelings. The percentage is still falling. In 1986 less        than half of the women surveyed thought that it was a good custom or a        natural duty.        So the Confucian notion of filial piety is        deteriorating very quickly. This is going to affect the pattern of        providing care in our country.        I have been talking about a lot of negative        things about my country, and you might get me wrong and think, "Maybe this        guy doesn't have any positive or constructive ideas about population        aging." But I do. In the year 2000 the proportion of those 65 and over        will be 17%, which is equivalent to the current Swedish level.        So in the year 2000, I will ask everybody to        stand in a line from the youngest to the oldest. And I will look at the        oldest 17% and call them "elderly persons." I will do the same thing every        year. So in other words in order to keep the economic burden of the        "elderly population" constant at the 17% level, I can change the        definition of an elderly person. So in the year 2025 the elderly will be        anyone who is 73.2 years old or over.        So in 2025, if the ranks of the elderly begin        at 73.2 years old, then we might be able to manage the problems of        population aging.        But I forgot to tell you one thing. I said        America has a relatively young population. Japan and the U.S. have serious        trade friction problems, but officials pay attention only to short term        figures. But I think they should keep population trends in mind when they        negotiate all these problems. My feeling is that the dollar, which is now        122 yen, could go as high as 200 in the years to come.        (The above article is offered for reference        purposes and does not necessarily represent the policy or views of the        Japanese Government)                        -          
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Naohiro OgawaBorn in 1944. Received his Ph.D. in economics from          the University of Hawaii. Has been Population Officer at the U.N.          Economic and Social Council for Asia and the Pacific. Is now professor          of economics at Nihon University. Author of The Family, the Market,          and the State in Ageing Societies (with John F. Ermisch),          Fertility Change in Contemporary Japan (with Robert W. Hodge) and          other books in English and Japanese.      |